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An Early Treatise on Peace Treaties:
Petrus Gudelinus between Roman Law
and Modern Practice
RANDALL LESAFFER
Most of the published works of Petrus Gudelinus (1550–1619),
professor at the Louvain Civil Law Faculty, concern the public law.
In his ‘commentaries’ on the Novellae and the Libri feodorum, he
did not limit himself to the learned law and classical examples but
also discussed the laws and customs of his own days. The same is
true of his little-known De jure pacis commentarius, which, though
formally presented as a commentary on the Pax Constantiae from
the Authenticum, is a treatise on issues from current peace-treaty
practice. In the most interesting part, Gudelinus addresses the
problem of private property and compensation for damages. On
this point, his work is more concurrent with contemporary
practices than Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis libri tres (1625).
GUDELINUS’ TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
The concise treatise De jure pacis commentarius was published in printed
form for the first time in 1620,1 shortly after the death of its author, Petrus
Gudelinus (1550–1619), professor at the Civil Law Faculty of Louvain. The
subsequent Louvain edition of 1628 received as its title De jure pacis
commentarius ad constitutionem Frederici de pace Constantiense. Later
editions were again given – more correctly – the concise title of De jure
pacis commentarius.2
Only a few autonomous treatises or commentaries on the law of peace
treaties that precede Gudelinus can be cited. The best known is the short
treatise by the fifteenth-century Italian canonist Martinus Garatus Laudensis
(d. 1453).3 More embracing works on international law or the law of war of
the late sixteenth century, like those of Balthasar de Ayala (1548–84) and
Albericus Gentilis (1552–1608), dealt only summarily with the subject.4 In
1625, a few years after the death of Gudelinus, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645)
devoted one chapter in the third book of his De jure belli ac pacis to the
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subject. The process of autonomization of the law of nations out of the
learned ius commune and theology only began to gain momentum during
the later sixteenth century. Moreover, the law of nations between states, or
rather between monarchs, was still barely distinguishable from general
contract law. Doubtless Grotius gave this an important, albeit prudent and
incomplete, impetus.5
All this makes the work of Gudelinus more notable. Before making an
analysis and giving an appreciation of the content of Gudelinus’ work on the
law of treaties, it is useful to place it within the context of the doctrinal
development of the law of nations, public law and even all of legal doctrine
around 1600.
THE RISE OF DOCTRINE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS AROUND 1600
The shadow cast by Hugo Grotius over the further development of the
doctrine of the law of nations has for a long time forced back into the dark
the works of earlier jurists and political theologians. Only around the
beginning of the twentieth century did changes occur. During the 1920s
and 1930s the American internationalist James Brown Scott succeeded in
shedding light on the role of the Spanish neo-scholastics, in particular on
the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria (c.1483–1546) and the Jesuit
Francisco Suarez (1548–1617).6 Since then in historiography, it is almost
universally recognized that the point of departure for the modern doctrine
of the law of nations is to be found within the school of the Spanish neo-
scholastics.7
During the second half of the sixteenth century, interest in the law of
nations was on the increase. Apart from the works of the Spanish neo-
scholastics, some important treatises were published on aspects of the law
of nations, for example the law of war and diplomatic law. They were
written by jurists of the Romanist tradition such as Albericus Gentilis, an
Italian working in Oxford, or by legal practitioners such as Balthasar de
Ayala, a judge-advocate with the Spanish Army in the Netherlands.8
The increased interest in the law of nations can easily be explained. The
Reformation and the almost permanent struggle between the Habsburg and
Valois dynasties for hegemony in Europe had plunged the traditional
European legal order into a deep crisis. The final remnants of the supremacy
of the Pope and the Emperor as spiritual and secular leaders of the Latin
West had been undermined. The great monarchies had achieved external
sovereignty and no longer had to submit themselves to higher authorities.
The medieval European legal order was shattered. In such a context there
was a need for a renewed concept and the development of a new legal order
for the Latin Christian world.9
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The Reformation and the discovery and conquest of new, pagan
countries across the oceans raised the question of the relationship between
law and religion in international affairs. The discoveries in Asia, Africa and
America gave a new dimension to maritime law. The almost permanent
state of war in large parts of Europe, the ideologizing of war as a result of
religious quarrels, and finally the increase in scale and the
professionalization of warfare, resulting from the Military Revolution,
forced a further development of the jus in bello. In Europe, political
relations between the sovereign powers became more intense, which
resulted in a rise of permanent diplomacy and important modifications to
diplomatic law.10
THE AUTONOMIZATION OF PUBLIC LAW
The principal work by Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, first
published in 1625, has often been considered as the first autonomous and
fairly exhaustive study on the law of nations.11 It should, however, be put
into the context of the wider long-term process, that of the scientification
and the autonomization of the law of nations. In the first half of the
seventeenth century, this evolution was felt within the Southern
Netherlands, more particularly in and around the Faculty of Civil Law at
Louvain.
During the decades between 1620 and 1650, several professors and/or
alumni of Louvain published treatises dealing with points of doctrine on the
law of nations. The law of war took a prominent place, partly as a
consequence of the war which was dragging on between the Northern
Provinces of the Netherlands and the Spanish Habsburgs and which
exploded once again with great ferocity after 1621.
In the first half of the seventeenth century Antonio Perez (1583–1672),
Diodorus Tuldenus (end 16th cent.–c.1645), Nicolaus Vernulaeus
(1583–1649) and Franciscus Zypaeus (1578–1650) wrote treatises on public
law and political theory.12 In these they gave quite substantial treatment to
certain questions of the law of nations. Their work proves that the rise of the
doctrine of the law of nations must be seen within a more comprehensive
process of emancipation of public law from the study and teachings of
Roman law.
Although this process came only to fruition during the second half of the
seventeenth century, important forerunners of the autonomization of public
law and political theory appeared from the late sixteenth century onwards.
This was, like the increased interest in the law of nations, the result of the
religious wars and of the internal destabilization of different regimes which
they caused. In most of the important European regions, relations between
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the monarchy and the estates underwent important changes, an evolution of
which the Netherlands gave one of the most spectacular examples. The
progress of secularization and the division between political and religious
morals also compelled a sharper articulation of theories legitimizing secular
authority and, from that, the development of secular political morals. The
works by Perez, Tuldenus, Vernulaeus and Zypaeus were only the
contribution from the Southern Netherlands to a much broader
development. Indeed, the work of Gudelinus preceded their contributions to
the law of nations.
THE LIFE AND WORKS OF GUDELINUS
Biographies of Gudelinus are few and rather limited. In essence they all
refer back to the funeral oration pronounced in 1619 in Louvain by
Maximilianus Wittebort.13
Petrus Gudelinus, or Pierre Goudelin, was born into an aristocratic
family in Ath in the County of Hainaut in 1550. At the age of 14 he was
already studying in Louvain at the Arts Faculty. He was a brilliant student
and did not go unnoticed. After he finished at the Faculty of Arts, he turned
to law and mathematics. In 1572 he graduated as a licentiate in Civil Law
and worked a few years as a lawyer in Malines and subsequently in Ath.
Many jurists of the sixteenth century stayed at the university for a short time
after finishing their studies before entering into a lucrative career either in
one of the courts, or in local administration or by becoming a lawyer.
Gudelinus did it the other way around. He would later refuse positions as a
councillor in the Council of the County of Hainaut and even in the Great
Council in Malines. In 1582 he returned permanently to his Alma Mater and
lectured on the Digest and the Codex as regius professor within the Law
Faculty. From 1590 onwards, he held the most prestigious Chair in the
Faculty of Civil Law, that of professor primarius. As primarius Gudelinus
was responsible for the teaching of the Digestum vetus and the Codex.14 He
held that chair until his death on 18 October 1619.15
For Gudelinus the De jure pacis commentarius was a logical or rather a
necessary completion of his two most important works, De jure novissimo
libri sex and De jure feudorum commentarii.16 As professor primarius he
lectured for almost three decades on the Codex. The traditional programme
of the Law Faculty also included studying and lecturing on the Novellae and
the Libri feudorum. As Gudelinus wrote in the introduction to his
commentary on the Novellae, he fostered a special interest in public law,
which he considered more ‘dignus’ than private law. Nevertheless in his
books on the Novellae he first dealt with private law and only after that with
public law – secular as well as ecclesiastical – as private law was more
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general and public law contained a more specific approach to law. By doing
so, he followed the system of the Digest and the Codex.17
Towards the end of the twelfth century, the glossators had added the
Libri feudorum, a record of Lombardian feudal law, as a tenth book to the
nine books of Novellae within the Authenticum. Gradually this book had
become an integral part of the authoritative corpus of Roman Law, which
was studied and commented upon at the European Law Faculties. Following
the humanistic jurists, Gudelinus was very much aware of the fact that the
Authenticum with its nine books of the Justinian Novellae was a product of
the glossators’ time. In the introduction to his De jure novissimo he briefly
explained the genesis of the medieval version of the Novellae and stated that
he would disregard the non-Justinian laws added later.18 He also mentioned
that he relied on the humanist text edition of Gregor Haloander
(c.1490–1551).19
This faith in the historical–philological methods of his humanist
predecessors did not, however, prevent Gudelinus from studying and
commenting on the Libri feudorum. After all, these writings were also
accepted as law ‘for us’, contrary to the suppressed laws of the nine books
which were not by Justinian (529–65).20 At the same time another
characteristic of the works of Gudelinus became apparent: his attention to
the prevailing customary law and the comparative approach which he
favoured along with it.21
DE JURE PACIS COMMENTARIUS WITHIN THE 
WORKS OF GUDELINUS
For a long period of time, modern historiography has accepted that the
Peace Treaty of Constanz of 1183, in connection with the Libri feudorum,
was also included in the Volumen parvum at the latest in the first decades of
the thirteenth century. According to Gero Dolezalek it is accurate that
different twelfth-century manuscripts of the Libri feudorum also contained
the text of this Peace Treaty. Nevertheless the text was only definitely added
to the tenth book with the emergence of printing. Dolezalek was of the
opinion that this also explained why Accursius (c.1182/1185–1263) did not
comment on the Peace of Constanz.22
The Peace of Constanz involved the Emperor Frederic Barbarossa
(1152–90) and the cities of the Lombardian League. It was formulated as a
privilege whereby the Emperor granted a number of rights and freedoms to
the North Italian cities.23 It can indeed be accepted as part of Lombardian
feudal law in so far as relations between the cities and the Emperor as
sovereign of the kingdom of Italy were concerned. During the Middle Ages
two important commentaries by jurists were made on this treaty: that of the
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glossator Odofredus de Denariis (d. 1265) and in particular that of the great
commentator Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400).24
At the end of the fourteenth century the Peace Treaty of Constanz again
came to the foreground. The Emperor Charles IV (1346–78) had made
important concessions to the rulers of different North Italian cities and as a
result, other cities and rulers considered their rights under the Peace of
Constanz to be injured. Some jurists raised the question of whether the
concessions included in the Treaty of 1183 had been unilaterally conceded
by the Emperor and therefore did not bind Charles IV, or if it involved
contractual obligations which had to be respected by both parties alike, the
cities and the Emperor. Within the context of this discussion Baldus studied
the Pax Constantiae. Apart from the question of whether the Peace of
Constanz belonged textually to the Volumen parvum, it remains clear that
Baldus and other jurists who dealt with the problem considered the Treaty
as part of the corpus of Lombardian feudal law and that it therefore
belonged to the sphere of the jus commune.25
At the end of the sixteenth century, the Pax Constantiae had definitely
been added to the tenth book of the Authenticum and had won its place in
the printed editions of the Corpus juris civilis. For Gudelinus to discuss this
peace was also a logical continuation of his comments on the Libri
feudorum.26 For that matter, at the beginning of his comments Gudelinus
justified his work with the remark that the Treaty of Constanz was included
in the Corpus juris civilis. He also referred to the commentaries of Baldus.27
Contrary to what the titles suggest, the commentarii of Gudelinus upon
the Novellae, the Libri feudorum and the Pax Constantiae were in style not
really commentaries, but were treatises explaining in a systematic way one
or more fields of the law. At the beginning of his work on the Novellae the
Louvain jurist announced that he would not follow the sequence of the
Novellae, nor of the Codex, but would examine the law according to the
more natural order of the Institutiones.28 In his De jure pacis Gudelinus
made it immediately clear to the reader that the text of the Peace of
Constanz, article by article, would by no means be the subject of
commentaries. According to him, Baldus had also abandoned such a
method of working. Even the content of the peace treaty hardly interested
Gudelinus, if at all.29 In fact he conceded that the presence of the Pax
Constantiae in the Corpus was nothing more than an opportunity to
comment on the theme of peace treaties in general.30
THE DIVISION OF THE TREATISE
In the 1685 folio publication of the Opera omnia of Gudelinus, the text of
De jure pacis commentarius covered less than 14 pages.31 The small treatise
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was divided into 12 capita, in each of which Gudelinus discussed a legal
problem connected with peace treaties. After a brief exposition of the
objectives and the method used, Gudelinus offered a definition of the
concept of peace. The second chapter contained a discussion on who had the
necessary authority to make peace treaties.
With chapter three he commenced discussing the contents of peace
treaties. In chapters four to eight he commented on different aspects of
restitution of goods and rights after a war, and also the validity of legal
proceedings of the war period. Special attention was given to the question
of the extent to which the sovereign could dispose of the goods of his
subjects and if they in turn could possibly claim damages from their rulers.
Chapter nine dealt with the question of whether agreements and treaties
with heretics were permitted and whether a sovereign could accept heresy
for the sake of peace. The attention paid by Gudelinus to this matter had of
course a lot to do with the uprising in the Netherlands. The influence of the
uprising was also felt in the discussion on the validity and legal force of
peace treaties. After an introductory chapter on this matter, Gudelinus
offered an eleventh chapter on the legal power of treaties between a
sovereign and his rebelling subjects. For that matter, rebellion as a problem
imbued the whole of the treatise. Gudelinus had an interest in this problem
in common with Balthasar de Ayala, to whom he repeatedly referred.32 In the
twelfth and last chapter Gudelinus returned to a problem more commonly
dealt with in medieval and early modern doctrine, namely whether the
successors to sovereigns who had agreed the treaties were also bound by
them. It is absolutely clear that the choice of these themes had nothing much
to do with the content of the Pax Constantiae, nor with its medieval
commentaries. Odofredus and Baldus were primarily concerned with
imperial power in relation to the North Italian city-states.33
Gudelinus’ themes and divisions connected closely with the reality of
treaty practice in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. For example, the
problem of goods and rights belonging to private individuals was lavishly
dealt with in the peace treaties of those days. Conflicts relating to the
restitution of goods often caused great difficulties for the parties involved at
the point of execution of the treaties.34 The attention given to the issue of
heresy and rebellion was, as has been said, a result of the war between the
Northern Provinces of the Netherlands and the Spanish monarchy. In this
also, Gudelinus shows his keen interest for contemporary law and for
prevailing customs.
Gudelinus’ De jure pacis preceded the work of Hugo Grotius on war and
peace by several years. In his De jure belli ac pacis Grotius devoted at least
one chapter to the law concerning peace treaties and one to the law
concerning truces.35 These chapters, together with a few other passages
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dealing with themes which were relevant to peace treaties, can be
considered as a temporary high point in the development of the doctrine on
that particular aspect of the law of nations.36 Grotius also devoted a lot of
attention to the problems of private goods and rights, albeit that his
contribution was not as extensive as that of Gudelinus.37 A second theme
that was examined thoroughly by Grotius, but was less prominent with
Gudelinus, was the question of under what conditions a treaty could or had
to be considered as violated.38 The binding power of peace treaties was
considered by Grotius as part of his discussion on the binding power of
treaties in general. However, the Dutch jurist, in a separate chapter, dealt
with the question of whether agreements made with enemies had to be
complied with. In this context the problem of treaties between sovereigns
and their subjects was indirectly discussed.39 All in all it can be put forward
that the treatment of the law of nations in relation to peace treaties by
Gudelinus was not much more limited than that by Hugo Grotius and was
therefore quite comprehensive for the time. As there were hardly any older,
systematic and exhaustive treatises or parts of treatises on this subject, this
cannot be referenced back to an existing tradition. Gudelinus did not refer
to the most relevant works or passages from authors like Garatus Laudensis
or Gentilis. His work was also different from that of Ayala, who was
nevertheless clearly a source of inspiration for him. In his treatise on the law
of war and military discipline, the Spanish military judge-advocate devoted
just one chapter to treaties. He discussed mainly the ancient Roman treaty
practice, based on Roman literary and historical sources. As a result he also
discussed typical Roman problems, which were of less significance for his
own time, such as the difference between foedus and sponsio. However, he
briefly mentioned the right of sovereigns to dispose of the property
belonging to their subjects and the binding power of treaties on the
successors of the parties involved in the treaty.40
Next to the influence of Ayala, a certain familiarity which Gudelinus
seemed to possess with treaty practice and with the international political
reality formed the basis of his thematic choices. The treatise was by no
means an exposé of the subject within the delineation of a few selected
authoritative legal texts. It was rather an effort to bring the customary
practices and the law of peace treaties within the context of the learned law
and to explain them according to the methods and with the help of the
textual and historical sources of the humanist jurists.
THE PERMANENT CHARACTER OF THE PEACE
Gudelinus defined peace, pax, as tranquilla libertas, bello contraria,
ejusque finis atque interitus.41 With this definition, the Louvain jurist
230 LEGAL HISTORY






































































introduced not only the classic antithesis to war but the definition ‘interitus’
gave an extra dimension with regard to content. This term referred to the
final settlement of the preceding conflict and the solution of the disputes
which were the causes for the war, with an objective of giving the peace a
more permanent nature.
It is precisely on this permanent nature that Gudelinus elaborated
further. The perpetuity of a treaty distinguished peace, pax, from truce,
indutiae or – vulgo – treuga. The fact that peace treaties were often broken
did not detract from the fact that in their essence the parties had entered
them for perpetuity. For this discrepancy between intention and reality,
Gudelinus found other examples in Roman private law. He compared peace
with the permanent nature of marriage or the irrevocable transfer of a
dowry. Indeed, the dowry was often returned in case of a divorce.42
Like Ayala, Gudelinus reached for the ancient Roman terminology.
Foedus as a Roman expression for a treaty was broader than pax. According
to Livy, the Romans knew three sorts of foedera: one with the defeated, one
after a war with no clear winner and one with a nation with whom one was
not at war.43 The last one certainly did not incorporate the idea of pax.
Unlike Ayala, Gudelinus did not elaborate on the Roman historical division
and gave no historical examples. The reference was not very meaningful
and looked like nothing more than an obligatory borrowing of an often cited
classification taken from Livy.44 The concept foedus was not even associated
with the remark made at the end of the first chapter, that a pax as an
agreement under public law had to be differentiated from agreements under
private law. Gudelinus did not at that moment attach further legal
consequences to this distinction.45 Grotius, at the beginning of his chapter on
peace, also made the distinction.46
THE RIGHT TO MAKE PEACE TREATIES
The right to make peace treaties was limited, according to Gudelinus, to the
Emperor, kings and sovereigns possessing the highest governing power in a
particular state and who did not recognize a higher authority. While
following Aristotle’s classical division of monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy, Gudelinus pointed out that this power in an aristocracy
belonged to the optimates, and in a democracy to the people as a whole.
Gudelinus emphasized, just like Grotius did after him, that the authority to
make peace treaties was associated with that of declaring war.47
In addition Gudelinus discussed the problem of delegation of power.
Within this he also referred to the difference between foedus and sponsio that
was characteristic of the Roman practice. According to Roman history a
foedus was a treaty which was binding for the res publica and had to be made
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in earlier times by the priests of the collegium fetialium and then later on by
authorized magistrates, acting with permission from the Senate. A sponsio
was an agreement made on his own initiative by a general which afterwards
had to be ratified before it could bind the Roman Republic.48 Ayala and
Gudelinus were both of the opinion that a general could not make a treaty on
his own initiative. With this Ayala referred to the distinction between foedus
and sponsio and introduced several examples from Roman history.
Gudelinus referred only to a passage in Sallust, also cited by Ayala, and gave
one historical example from ancient history. Furthermore he appealed to the
authority of Bartolus (1314–57).49 Gudelinus extended the discussion when
he asked himself the question as to whether provincial and local magistrates,
who as deputies had been granted a general authority from the sovereign,
could make peace treaties. Gudelinus looked for a connection with the legal
concept of procuration.50 With arguments on the basis of the Digest and the
Decretals he reached the conclusion that this authority could not be taken to
be a general mandate. In addition he gave examples of sponsiones entered
into by Roman magistrates. Four of the six examples he took from Livy
could also be found in Ayala. The jurist Gudelinus offered, however, a more
elaborate argument than the practician Ayala, using for this purpose texts and
references out of Roman and canon law.51
Gudelinus followed the opinion of Ayala that the making of long-lasting
truces was also the prerogative of the sovereign. Only short truces with an
exclusively military finality could be made by generals or administrators on
their own initiative. Just like Ayala, Gudelinus mentioned that Bartolus
defended a different opinion on this point and accepted that generals and
subordinate administrators could make long-lasting truces. For the
argument against Bartolus, both Ayala and Gudelinus turned to procuration.
A mandatory could grant no extension of payment to the debtor of his
mandator without a special mandate, no more than he could dispose of the
matter. The war was a means to obtain justice, and a truce constituted a
delay in the pursuance of this means. Contrary to the Spaniard, the Louvain
jurist referred explicitly to Jason de Mayno (1435–1519) and other
commentators with regard to the title in the Digest about De pactis.52
Gudelinus concluded his argument with an example from the Peloponnesian
War, again also mentioned by Ayala.53
THE CONTENTS OF PEACE TREATIES
Gudelinus started his analysis, as regards the contents of peace treaties, with
the remark that peace treaties resemble in many respects transactions
between private litigants. In treaties, for example, beside explicit
stipulations, there could also be tacit ones. Two stipulations were always to
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be found in peace treaties: the suspension of hostilities and arrangements
concerning conquered and seized objects.54
The purpose of any peace treaty being reconciliation, an oblivio or
amnesty was at least tacitly included in all treaties. The subject of all
injustices and damages inflicted during the war was declared closed. Indeed,
under the law of war, causing harm or doing injustice to the enemy during
a war was permissible.55 Gudelinus was of the opinion that an amnesty had,
for a long time, always been included in treaties. This was also the case with
the Pax Constantiae. Furthermore the author offered some examples from
Greek and Roman Antiquity.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century the amnesty clause had
already strongly penetrated treaty practice. This clause implied that no de
facto revenge could be taken or legal prosecution opened for actions
perpetrated during the war between the belligerents, their legal subordinates
and their allies. An exception was made for common crimes. The clause,
however, had become general only during the fifteenth century, so that the
assertion of Gudelinus that it was long-lived and appeared in most treaties
was not justified.
The claim that amnesty was tacitly implied in each peace treaty was also
sustained by Grotius and by the great authors on the law of nations of the
eighteenth century.56 In practice, this was not accepted as a sufficient
guarantee until the eighteenth century, and from the sixteenth to the
eighteenth centuries amnesty was expressly stipulated. Almost all peace
treaties from these three centuries contained such an amnesty clause.
Furthermore, until the middle of the seventeenth century the relevant
articles of the treaty described rather extensively the contents of the
amnesty. From the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, the text
changed into a short standardized clause. The clause disappeared only in the
nineteenth century. From then on, in doctrine as well as in practice, it was
accepted that the clause was included automatically and tacitly.57
Gudelinus defined the amnesty clearly and in detail. Not only acts
performed during the war, but also those performed as a consequence of the
war were included. Contrary to what was generally accepted and stipulated
in treaties, actions in compensation or rei vindicatio with no punitive motive
were excluded from the amnesty. For this also Gudelinus referred to an
example from Roman history.58
RESTITUTION CLAUSES
In chapters four to eight inclusive, Gudelinus elaborated on the stipulations
in peace treaties concerning the restitution of goods and rights after the war.
Essentially he talked about occupied territories and goods captured during
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the war. The fate of prisoners of war was brought up in connection with 
this issue.
In chapter four Gudelinus put forward the proposition that there had to
be an explicit clause of restitution if one wanted to restore the pre-war legal
situation of goods and rights. Restitution of property and rights was,
contrary to remission of all offences, not tacitly included in peace
agreements.59 From what follows, he seemed similarly to hold that an
explicit clause was necessary for the release of prisoners of war as well. In
view of the contemporary laws of war – especially those on ransom – this
was only natural.60
Here, Gudelinus turned to the Roman jus postliminii. Under classical
Roman law, the jus postliminii restored to a Roman citizen, who had been
captured and enslaved by a foreign nation, his citizenship, rights and
property upon his return. By Justinian’s time, the jus postliminii had already
for a long time become a right by and large restricted to prisoners of war.
Gudelinus however asked whether the jus postliminii was also valid in cases
where there were no stipulations in the treaty about the restitution of goods
and rights and the release of prisoners of war. In fact the question was
whether the jus postliminii applied in peacetime as well as in wartime.
Gudelinus referred to the famous fragment from the Digest by
Pomponius on the jus postliminium in pace.61 The fragment referred to the
situation of a Roman citizen taken captive by a people with whom the
Roman were not at war but with whom they had no treaty of hospitium or
amicitiae.62 According to Gudelinus however, jus postliminii in pace meant
that, even when nothing was stipulated in the peace treaty, prisoners of war
were automatically released once the peace was signed. Even more so,
Gudelinus seemed to imply that the existence of jus postliminii in pace
meant the same as a general restitution of all captured goods. In particular
towns and fortifications would also be delivered up.63
In view of his interpretation of postliminium, Gudelinus could not but
answer negatively to the question of whether postliminium applied in pace in
order to sustain that restitution and release had to be expressly stipulated in
the treaty, and in order to uphold the right to booty and ransom. He had to
refute Accursius’ position for that. Gudelinus founded his opinion upon two
text fragments from the Digest.64 He reproached Accursius and his followers
that they had given too broad an interpretation to the text.65 At the same time
he rejected a possible counter-argument made up on the basis of the famous
text fragment of Pomponius. Gudelinus pointed out that Pomponius restricted
the latter only to nations with whom no treaty of friendship or alliance existed
and therefore were also considered as enemies in peacetime.66
Restitution of goods was only possible after a war with a hostis justus.
According to Gudelinus this had to be another sovereign or another nation.
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Pirates, robbers or rebels did not enjoy the benefits of the jus in bello and
could obtain nothing on the basis of the law of war. Therefore they could not
keep goods of the opposing party by right, so the jus postliminii – only during
the war itself – as well as the clause of restitution was not applicable.67
In the context of this discussion, the author touched for the first time on
an issue regarding warfare between a sovereign and his rebelling subjects.
In other words, he reflected upon the war in the Low Countries. Gudelinus
departed from a discriminatory concept of war. Rebels could be considered
by the sovereign as hostes, while he alone could enjoy the advantages of the
law of war. On the other hand, rebels, who had no right to raise arms against
their sovereign, could not appeal to the law of war. They could only obtain
restitution of their goods by explicit stipulation in the treaty, or thanks to
regal magnanimity. Gudelinus pointed out that Frederic Barbarossa showed
such magnanimity on the occasion of the Pax Constantiae. This passage, in
the light of the general rule that restitution had to be explicitly agreed after
the war between the justi hostes, made sense only when it was read
simultaneously with the preceding one dealing with pirates, robbers and
rebels. From this simultaneous reading one could deduce that in fact,
according to Gudelinus, the justus hostis fighting against a rebel could never
lose his claim over lost goods and possessions, so that in his case a clause
of restitution was redundant. The loot and territories taken from the rebels
were considered as just prizes under the law of war.68 Only by an explicit
stipulation in favour of these pirates, robbers or rebels could this
‘inequality’ could be lifted.
PRIVATE GOODS AND RIGHTS
In the next chapter Gudelinus described the contents and the limitations of the
restitution clauses in peace treaties. He made it clear that it was not confined
to goods and rights falling under the jus postliminii. Furthermore, not only the
sovereign or the state but also the citizens could recover their goods and
rights. Goods, claims, titles and honours fell under the restitution clauses.69
Exception had to be made for goods already consumed. Only an explicit
clause could deviate from this rule and permit some kind of compensation. In
principle the sovereign had to respect the rights acquired by his subjects.70
Restitution did not apply to goods which had in the meantime been inherited
or valuables already transmitted to the treasury.71 Treaties could deviate from
these general rules. In this respect Gudelinus referred to a peace treaty from
1543 between Charles V (1516–58) and the rebellious city of Ghent, a rare
instance of him using a recent historical example.72
A remaining question which Gudelinus had to deal with was what
happened to profits gained on an estate during the occupation of that estate.
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He agreed on that point with the majority view expressed in the medieval
legal doctrine. He rejected the thesis of Jason that when there was full
restitution the profits had to be included, and he found support for this in
Accursius amongst others. According to Gudelinus the profits, once
separated from the goods in question, constituted a separate good and were
not included in the decision of restitution of the properties concerned.73
Under private law, profits were included in the obligation of restitution in
cases where the question could be raised of fraud or male fide possession:
in these cases the possessor had no right whatsoever to benefit from the
profits. During war, however, the law of war prevailed, which allowed that
one could enjoy the profits of occupied goods.74 Gudelinus again excluded
rebellious subjects from the right to keep the profits. Only when
circumstances compelled him to do so could the sovereign accept retention
of the profits generated by goods held by the rebels, like Barbarossa had
done in 1183.75
Gudelinus’ views fitted remarkably closely with the accepted practice.
Important peace treaties, from the fifteenth century onwards – even long-
lasting truces like those between France and England during and after the
Hundred Years War – usually contained extensive clauses of restitution. In
principle restitution was ordered for all goods, rights and honours
confiscated by the enemy during the war. An exception was normally made
for profits and rents.76
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD
In chapter six, Gudelinus dealt with the question of whether a sovereign
could, in the course of a peace negotiation, dispose of the goods and rights
of his subjects. First he postulated that a sovereign, apart from his own
patrimony, could transfer ownership of all the goods belonging to the realm
or to the public domain. With an appeal to the Spanish jurist Fernandus
Vasquius (1512–69), however, Gudelinus stated that this prerogative was
not unequivocal for goods over which the sovereign was not the dominus,
such as the properties of his subjects. The extent of the royal power was a
matter for serious doubt.
These doubts did not concern lands occupied or goods captured during the
war. Under the law of war, these lands and goods had changed owners, a
situation that could be confirmed by treaty. The same applied to the right for
compensation for war damages. Gudelinus saw a problem only in the case
where rebellious subjects had occupied lands or damaged private goods and
could, by virtue of an agreement, keep them or not be bound to payment for
damages. The Louvain jurist referred explicitly to the pacification of the
Netherlands, and more specifically to the Twelve Year Truce (1609–21).77
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Gudelinus left it in no doubt that the sovereign could not transfer
ownership of goods and rights of his subjects under any circumstance. Even
when one agreed that the sovereign was not bound by the jus civile or the
municipal law, he had to abide by the natural law that imposes respect for
the property of others. Again Gudelinus referred to Vasquius in order to give
more weight to his argument.78
This natural law principle however was not absolute. When the need was
compelling or the public interest made it appropriate, the sovereign could
dispose of private goods and rights. He could do that particularly when this
was the price to be paid for achieving peace. The fact that the goods
concerned had been already in other hands for a long time was therefore an
important element, according to Gudelinus.79 For this the jurist also found a
close connection with the prevailing treaty practice.80 Precisely due to the
fact that one did not wish to turn upside down situations that had been in
force a long time, and not wanting to provoke endless legal disputes, the
general practice for treaties – also in other situations than just in the struggle
against rebels – was to renounce the restitution clause.81 Gudelinus,
however, merely restricted himself to the example of the Roman civil
wars.82
This exception did not imply that the divine law or the natural law could
in some cases be put aside. There were indeed many rules which fell under
these categories and between them an internal hierarchy prevailed. ‘Salus
populi suprema lex’ was for Gudelinus as much a rule of divine and natural
law as the rules of mine and thine. God and nature had entrusted the
sovereigns with the care of the entire societas humana. Their responsibility
for the common good was more important than for the private interest.
When peace was at stake, other rules of law must recede. These views
indicated the influence of Vasquius and through him of the neo-scholastic
school.83
Chapter seven was the logical complement to what had preceded. Here
it was established whether private persons could, in case of transfer of their
properties or rights, be entitled to compensation at the expense of the public
domain. For Gudelinus such claims existed in principle.84 He thereby
referred to the example of the lex Rhodia de jactu, which according to him
was valid not only for the whole of the Empire but also outside it, on the
basis of the aequitas of this law. The lex Rhodia dealt with the case of a sea
captain who had to throw part of his shipment overboard in order to save the
ship, in which it was determined that the damage incurred should be spread
amongst all owners concerned.85 Therefore, Gudelinus was of the opinion
that war damages – or more exactly damages caused by the peace
compromise – specifically inflicted on certain private persons also had to be
supported by the collective.86 Furthermore the Louvain jurist referred once
237PETRUS GUDELINUS ON PEACE TREATIES






































































again to several examples from the time of the Roman Republic and the
civil war.87 In two instances the claim for damages became invalid: first
when the person concerned bore responsibility himself for the damage and
second when the damage was of such magnitude that the possessions of the
sovereign or the treasury could barely meet them.88
JUDGEMENTS AND AGREEMENTS
Chapter eight was also devoted to an aspect of the impact of war and peace
on private rights, namely the validity of judgements pronounced by the
enemy during the war and of agreements made between enemies before or
during the war. The first instance essentially concerned judgements
pronounced by the enemy in occupied territories which afterwards changed
owners again, and also judgements pronounced during the war against
foreign, hostile subjects.
According to Gudelinus this problem had to be approached the same
way as the question of restitution. The restitution clauses served the purpose
of reinstating everybody to his pre-war legal status as far as possible. This
implied that all one-sided legal acts and decisions of the enemy as well as
all legal acts committed with hostile intent because of the war had to be
recalled. Legal acts completed between enemies during a war, but belonging
to the normal legal life, like the compliance with a contractual obligation,
did not come under the principle of restitution.89
Gudelinus’ more specific comments on the question of the validity of
judgements pronounced during the war and between enemies were very
brief. In principle these judgements retained legal force, because the
belligerent on the basis of the law of war had jurisdiction over territories of
the enemy. This was of course not the case as far as rebels were concerned.
Therefore, explicit agreements had to be made with respect to judgements
pronounced by a rebel force, as set out in the Pax Constantiae.90
RELIGIOUS WARS
After this extensive exposition concerning private goods and rights,
Gudelinus turned back to more traditional themes of the law of war and
treaty law. He opened chapter nine with the general assertion that care for
religion was the most important responsibility for a sovereign and that no
better motive for war existed than the defence of the faith.91 Agreements
with heretics, whereby they were granted some concession in religious
matters, could only be made in extreme cases. Gudelinus referred to the
example of religious pacification in the sixteenth century in the Empire as
well as in France.92
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Gudelinus rejected the counter-argument that exceptions could be given
on the grounds that any obligation to perform unlawful actions was
prohibited in the private law of contract. He was of the opinion that the act
of tolerating heresy did not mean an acceptance of it. Christian Emperors
like Constantine the Great (312–37), Theodosius the Great (379–95) and
Justinian tolerated paganism, divorce, usury and concubinage, as
Christianity was not yet completely established. For Gudelinus tolerance
towards heresy could only be a temporary measure, which had to emanate
from necessity.93 He called in fact upon Gratian (c.1100–1160), who also
held the opinion that a pact with heretics was allowed when necessity
compelled it.94 He also found a supplementary argument in the divine origin
of sovereignty. In extreme necessity the sovereign had the duty to make
concessions to his recalcitrant subjects in order to protect his sovereignty as
far as possible.95
THE BINDING POWER OF PEACE TREATIES
The legality or binding power of a peace treaty is founded on the fides,
from which the term foedus is in fact derived, Gudelinus stated. The peace
treaty is sacrosanct and cannot be infringed. To describe the concept of
fidelity Gudelinus turned to the definition given by Cicero (106–43 BC):
dictorum conventorum constantia.96 He indicated that the binding power
of peace treaties was all the more forceful as they were generally ratified
by oath. This had also been the case with the Pax Constantiae. The
binding force of an oath was not only recognized by Christians, but also
by pagans.97
There could be no doubt about the faith placed in one’s word given to
the enemy in the course of a war. Gudelinus appealed for this to Bartolus
amongst others. He did not agree, however, with Bartolus and other
commentators like Raphaël Fulgosius (1367–1427) who made a distinction
between private and public agreements and treaties. The rule of good faith
was indeed prescribed by natural law and was universal. In addition he
referred to several literary sources from Antiquity as well as to Augustine
(354–430), Franciscus Duarenus (1509–59), Diego de Covarrubias
(1512–77) and Ayala, in support of his thesis.98
If one has to keep good faith towards the enemy during a war, how much
more must this be the case after a war, Gudelinus asked. By this he wanted
to introduce a further argument in favour of the inviolability of peace
treaties.99
Gudelinus was very brief on the problem of the violation of peace
treaties. He defended the thesis that when the adversary broke his word, the
injured party could consider the whole of the treaty as obsolete.100 The
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Dutchman Grotius was to devote a much more comprehensive discussion to
this theme.101 Gudelinus took no account of the custom in treaty practice of
inserting sanctions in the event of violations on the part of subjects or allies,
thus guaranteeing a permanent binding to the treaty.102 For rebellious
subjects a treaty with the sovereign had the force of a real royal statute, and
not of a contract. Therefore infringements were commonly punished
without detracting from the validity of that ‘statute’. For once Gudelinus
could refer to the comments by Baldus on the Pax Constantiae.103 Sanctions
for such infringements belonged, according to Gudelinus, to the imperium
of the sovereign rather than to the jurisdiction of the courts.104
FIDES WITH REGARD TO REBELLIOUS SUBJECTS
In light of the uprising in the Netherlands and the Twelve Year Truce
between the Estates-General of the rebellious provinces and the Spanish
King, Gudelinus could not ignore the problem of the fidelity to the treaty on
the part of the sovereign towards his own rebellious subjects.105 A number
of authors, including Ayala, maintained that the sovereign was not bound to
his agreements with rebels. Rebellious groups were well advised when they
involved another sovereign to make an agreement in their name.106
Gudelinus rejected Ayala’s opinion and believed that sovereigns were also
bound by agreements and pacts with their own subjects. This obligation was
not based on the fact that the sovereign submitted to the jus civile, as
Vasquius maintained, but on his subordination to natural law and to the law
of nations, as Duarenus and Panormitanus (d.1445) put it.107
In the following paragraphs, Gudelinus refuted a number of possible
counter-arguments. Equating rebels with robbers and pirates was not
sufficient reason for the sovereign to be released from his given word
towards them. For Gudelinus the fact that the sovereign made an agreement
with his rebellious subjects was sufficient evidence that he considered
himself bound by it. Of this the 1183 Pax Constantiae was a classic
example.108
Exceptions of duress and fear, vis metusve, could only be invoked,
according to Gudelinus, by private persons, in order to escape an agreement.
In relation to his rebellious subjects the sovereign could not escape and was
at all times bound by the agreements made with his subjects. Gudelinus did
not, however, recognize a general difference between private law and public
law concerning the binding force of treaties and the problem of fides. He
based his thesis on other arguments. Bravery and firmness were royal
virtues. A sovereign was not easily subject to fear or coercion. Only in
extreme circumstances was it conceivable that a sovereign would be forced
against his will to an agreement, but in this event it would have been very
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unlikely that the rebels would have remained interested in such an
agreement. Gudelinus held the opinion that discussions around the
exception of vis metusve had no ground.109 Furthermore the lesser interest
did not diminish from the greater one, and what was more important than
peace?110
THE BINDING POWER OF PEACE TREATIES ON THE 
SUCCESSORS OF THE TREATY PARTNERS
In his last chapter, Gudelinus elaborated on a problem which stood central
in treaty practice as well as in the doctrine of the late Middle Ages and Early
Modern period. Until late in the sixteenth century treaties between rulers
could hardly be distinguished on a formal legal basis from common
agreements between private persons under private law. These were not
inter-state but inter-sovereign agreements. Treaties did not mention states as
parties to the treaty, only sovereigns. This was also generally and to some
extent the case with republics, where reference was made to the head of
government or, at best, to a collective governing body.111
Because agreements were concluded between persons, not bodies
politic, this posed the problem of the binding force of treaties towards the
successors of the sovereigns who had made a treaty. Until the sixteenth
century, in practice it was considered that the successor of somebody who
was a party to a treaty had to ratify the treaty explicitly before he was bound
by it. Some treaties stipulated a term after the succession to the throne
within which the new sovereign had to perform this, if he wanted the treaty
to remain valid. Sometimes the successor was made to ratify the treaty
while the partner in the treaty was still alive.
Gudelinus started his exposition by quoting some examples from
Antiquity demonstrating that the binding of the successors was not an
automatic fact.112 Then he joined Ayala in his argument for validity. On the
basis of text fragments from different medieval canonists, Ayala stated that
peace was an agreement under public law. The sovereign did not make the
treaty in his own name but in the name of the res publica, which was
perennial. Just as an ecclesiastical prelate could bind the Church beyond the
limitations of his own term of office, the sovereign could bind the state.
Even changes in the form of government had no influence on the binding
force of a treaty.113
Gudelinus took a remarkable position regarding the oath. Until late in
the seventeenth century, most treaties were confirmed or ratified through an
oath sworn by the sovereigns. In the Middle Ages and even in the early
sixteenth century it was generally accepted that only by this swearing of the
oath did the treaty achieve binding force. From this, an argument could be
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constructed for the thesis that treaties were not binding for the legal
successors. According to many jurists the oath was indeed not transferable.
Gudelinus did not take up a position over the question of whether an oath
was personal or transferable. But he stated that not the oath but the
conventio was the causa principalis of the agreement. The oath provided
only an extra guarantee by means of the sanctions imposed through
perjury.114 This position was in accordance with the evolution of this practice
in the sixteenth century and was adopted by the natural law jurists of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.115
With the thesis in favour of the validity of treaties with regard to
successors, Gudelinus, just like Ayala and Grotius, stood at the beginning of
the autonomization of statutory inter-state treaties, separated from the
private law of contracts. Like both his predecessors, Gudelinus accepted the
distinction between private agreements and treaties on the one hand and
public treaties on the other. That distinction, however, only brought about a
few concrete results. The most important, no doubt, was the unequivocal
acceptance of the legal force of treaties towards successors. It also acted a
few times as an argument when interests under private law had to give way
to the common good.
The idea that a sovereign made a treaty on behalf of the state had
developed gradually in the course of sixteenth-century treaty practice.
This could be seen amongst other things in the reversion to the custom
whereby sovereigns brought their main vassals and the mightiest cities of
the realm to co-sign and co-ratify a treaty. To the extent that treaties were
personal commitments by the rulers themselves, they could in fact only
indirectly bind their subjects. They promised to their partner in the treaty
that they would use their domestic powers for the execution of the clauses
of the treaty. As an extra guarantee the partner often requested the direct
approval of the treaty by the most powerful vassals and cities within the
realm of his partner. The binding force of treaties towards legal successors
also underwent an evolution within the legal practice of the sixteenth
century.116
Here doctrine tailed somewhat behind the evolution of practice. Like
other authors before and after him, Gudelinus looked for inspiration to the
Roman concepts pertaining exclusively to public law of the foedus, when at
the beginning of his treatise he catalogued peace treaties as foedera. It is
indeed noticeable that, when discussing the only important legal result
which he linked to the public character of peace treaties, he did not refer to
the distinction between foedera and other kinds of agreements, but
restricted himself to more pragmatic and contemporary arguments.
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THE HUMANIST LEGAL DOCTRINE
The professorship of Petrus Gudelinus at the University of Louvain
coincided with the heyday there of humanism. Humanism also influenced
the Law Faculty. The first humanist scholars who had exerted influence
upon the study of legal doctrine were Lorenzo Valla (1407–57) and Angelo
Poliziano (1454–94). They lectured that knowledge of classical Latin and a
correct understanding of ancient history were necessary conditions for the
study of Roman law. From this position they made fierce criticisms of the
works of the glossators and in particular of the commentators, like Bartolus
and Baldus.117
In the early sixteenth century humanist legal doctrine flourished, mainly
at the University of Bourges in France. The Frenchman Gulielmus Budaeus
(1468–1540) and the Italian Andreas Alciatus (1492–1550) are rightly
considered to be the real founders of the mos gallicus. Nowadays legal
history no longer claims that the mos italicus or Bartolism and the mos
gallicus or humanism were diametrically opposed.
The concern of humanist jurists was to reconstruct the juridical
auctoritates in their original form. They recognized that the Corpus juris
civilis had been the product of its time and age, within a specific
civilization. An exact interpretation of the texts needed, in their opinion, an
understanding of the historic conditions under which these texts, and the
legal regulations which they contained, had developed. The
philological–historical concern of the humanists resulted in sharp criticism
of the works of their medieval predecessors.
The humanist approach led to a relativization of the authority of the
ancient legal texts. No longer were they perceived as the emanation of a
timeless, unchanging and ideal legal system. The Corpus of Emperor
Justinian was from then on looked at for what it was: the legal system of a
particular civilization, which came about in a specific place and time, but
which was still unparalleled and worthy of being studied and followed.
Although one will certainly find examples of humanists whose interest
in Roman law was mainly of an antiquarian nature and for whom the study
of Roman law was an erudite and esoteric occupation, far remote from
actual practice, this did not apply to the vast majority of learned jurists who
are traditionally designated as ‘humanists’. The second generation of
French humanist Romanists, such as Jacobus Cuiacius (1522–90) and Hugo
Donellus (1527–91), had a great interest in practice and neither confined
themselves to the application of Roman law alone. The relativization of the
claims to timelessness and invariability of Roman law saw to it that
humanists of the second generation became more interested in the study of
their own municipal customary law.
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Armed with the philological–historical method, humanist jurists wanted
to acquire a better and more correct understanding of the Roman law than
had been possible for the commentators. However, this did not result in an
underestimation of the achievements brought about by Bartolism. Rather
they tried to improve the works of Bartolus and Baldus by using this
method.
Humanist jurists did not blow up the bridges between legal doctrine
and practice that had been laid by the medieval jurists, but they adjusted
the relationship between theory and practice. The commentators had, on
the basis of the almost absolutist claims of the Corpus, mainly
endeavoured to make Roman law relevant to contemporary legal practice.
Their démarche was that of scholastic–dialectical interpretation and
reinterpretation of the authoritative sources, with the objective of finding
an answer that was useful and desirable for the legal problem at hand. On
the other hand, jurists influenced by humanism perceived Roman law
more as an historic example to be followed rather than a timeless and
perennial system. With these beliefs they tried to transfer the strengths and
richness of Roman law onto contemporary law. Rather then adapting
Roman law to the needs of practice, they wanted to bring contemporary
law nearer to the learned law. In this manner they contributed significantly
to the scientification and systematization of both the municipal law
systems and the law of nations.118
CONCLUSION
Humanism made its way to the Louvain Civil Law Faculty thanks to
Nicolaus Everardus (1462–1532) and chiefly Gabriel Mudaeus (d.1560).
They were followed by the majority of professors in Civil Law who pursued
a line of moderate humanism, combining a philological–historical approach
with a keen interest for legal practice. Within this tradition of the Louvanist
via media between mos italicus and mos gallicus, they did not disregard the
study of the works by the great commentators. In the first half of the
seventeenth century, humanism in Louvain flourished, with figures like
Erycius Puteanus (1574–1646) and Nicolaus Vernulaeus. This was also felt
at the Faculty of Civil Law.119 Gudelinus came under the influence of
humanism. This had already been shown in the introduction to his De jure
novissimo where he announced that he would use as his basis the amended
text edition of the Novellae. In De jure pacis commentarius Gudelinus
appears as an advocate of the via media held by the humanist legal tradition
in Louvain.
First of all, his treatise was written in a sober but classic Latin. He made,
with one exception, no references in Greek.120 Secondly, several times
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Gudelinus makes an explicit use of the philological–historical method of the
humanists. Thereby, he does not avoid criticizing medieval Bartolists, nor
even ancient jurists. Thus he rejects the assertion by Ulpian that pactio was
an etymological derivation of pax, and not the reverse.121 On other points he
rejects the interpretations concerning content, as made by the glossators and
commentators.122 This does not prevent him from frequently referring to the
opinions and arguments of his medieval predecessors, Romanists as well as
canonists. He does not accept their opinions as unassailable authorities, but
enters into debate with them. Thirdly, Gudelinus makes frequent use of
historical examples from Antiquity. Undoubtedly, Gudelinus was less
familiar with ancient literature than with text traditions of medieval learned
law. Many of the examples out of ancient literature he borrows from Ayala,
or from the classic topoi of his time. Also he continually quotes from the
same, important ancient writings. Livy is by far the most quoted.
The fourth and most striking characteristic of Gudelinus’ treatise is,
however, his obviously great understanding of treaty practice. Although he
seldom refers to examples from recent history, his work bears witness to his
concern for the problems and issues which appeared in treaty practice of his
own time. His perspective is thereby rather dominated by the problems
which had arisen on account of the war against the rebellious Northern
Netherlands, but it is not limited by them. His relatively great interest in the
struggle against rebellious subjects and religious dissenters had its origins
in the uprising.
The best developed and at the same time the most original parts of his
treatise are the chapters dealing with private property and rights after the
war. On the one hand Gudelinus enters into the discussion of the extent of
royal authority, which was then a popular topic in political literature. The
works of Jean Bodin and the neo-scholastics, and especially the work of
Vasquius, often quoted by Gudelinus, have to be mentioned. But on the
other hand his treatment of restitution reaches much further than any other
older treatise and is even more detailed on the point of the restitution of
property from private owners than the work of Grotius a few years later.
Also noticeable is the important parallel between the propositions of
Gudelinus and the treaty practice of the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries. By this the Louvain humanist contributed to the scientification of
customary treaty law.
Gudelinus’ treatise should be placed in the midst of a process of
autonomization of the law of nations from the learned legal tradition.
Formally Gudelinus places his treatise within the tradition of the jus
commune by presenting it as a commentary on the Pax Constantiae. But as
he immediately remarks, his treatise is more than a comment on the Peace
Treaty, it is a systematic discussion of the current treaty law. Where he can,
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and where he considers it useful, he refers to the medieval tradition of the
learned law. For in so far as treaty law is still part of general contract law,
this is entirely legitimate. Where this is not possible, he is not afraid of
presenting independent arguments, in which he places the specific practices
of treaty law within a doctrinal context.
Gudelinus did not exercise much influence on the further development
of the doctrine of the law of nations.123 There is, perhaps, a simple
explanation in the very fact that this work preceded the masterpiece of the
great Dutch jurist by only a few years. The impact of De jure belli ac pacis
was immediately so tremendous that older treatises, which were relevant for
the law of nations, were neglected by the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Moreover, in the seventeenth century, the Southern Netherlands
had no important theorists in the law of nations who could have given
Gudelinus’ De jure pacis commentarius – in spite of its numerous reprints
in Louvain, Antwerp and Cologne – more international fame.124
NOTES
1. Petrus Gudelinus, De jure pacis commentarius, in quo praecipuae de hoc jure quaestionis
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2. The different later publications are: De jure pacis commentarius, in quo praecipuae de hoc
jure quaestionis distinctis capitibus eleganter pertractantur, editio secunda, Louvain, 1641,
editio tertia, Louvain, 1663, editio quarta, Cologne, 1663. A notable publication is: De jure
pacis commentarius: in quo praecipuae & nunc maxime, dum de Europae Pace Monasterii
agitur, necessariae de hoc jure quaestionis proponuntur & expenduntur. Accedit Marci
Zuerii Boxhonii de amnestia dissertatio, Leiden, 1648. There was also a publication in 1662
in Arnhem. The work has also been published at different times together with Gudelinus’
comments on the Libri feudorum: Petrus Gudelinus and Henricus Zoesius, De jure feudorum
et pacis commentarii, ad mores Belgii et Franciae conscripti, quibus in hac iterata editione
accessêre Henrici Zoesii...Praelectiones Feudales, nunc primum editae, Louvain, 1641;
Petrus Gudelinus and Henricus Zoesius, De jure feudorum et pacis commentarii ad mores
Belgii et Franciae conscripti...editio tertia correctior, Louvain, 1663; Petrus Gudelinus,
Hieronymus Nempaeus and Henricus Zoesius, De jure feudorum et pacis
commentarii...Praelectiones feudales, editio quarta correctior, Cologne, 1663. Twice it was
published with his commentaries on the Novellae: Commentariorum de jure novissimo libri
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Opera omnia in unum volumen redacta, Antwerp, 1685. René Dekkers, Bibliotheca Belgica
Juridica. Een bio-bibliografisch overzicht der rechtsgeleerdheid in de Nederlanden van de
vroegste tijden af tot 1800, Brussels, 1951, 64–5.
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